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I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs agree with the first sentence in the State’s August 22,
2016 filing – i.e., “In 2014, the Court held the State in contempt for failing
to submit a complete plan for meeting the Court’s 2018 deadline for
constitutional compliance, not for failing to meet the 2018 deadline that
had not yet arrived.”1
But as the following pages explain, plaintiffs do not agree that the
State’s response to the questions asked in this Court’s July 14 Order
establishes the State even has the type of complete plan ordered by this
Court – never mind that the State has submitted one.
II.

THE COURT’S FOUR GENERAL QUESTIONS

This Court’s July 14 Order prefaced its questions with the
following explanation:
Before making a decision on whether the State is in compliance, we
will hear from the parties on precisely what the legislature has
accomplished, what remains to be accomplished, and what
significance we should attach to E2SSB 6195. The 2017 legislative
session presents the last opportunity for complying with the State’s
paramount duty under article IX, section 1 by 2018. What remains to
be done to achieve compliance is undeniably huge, but it is not
undefinable. At this juncture, seven years since enactment of
ESHB 2261 and six years since enactment of SHB 2776, the State can
certainly set out for the court and the people of Washington the
detailed steps it must take to accomplish its goals by the end of the
next legislative session. [July 2016 Order at pp.1-2.]

1

State Of Washington’s August 22 Brief Responding To Order Dated July 14, 2016.
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This Court’s July 14 Order accordingly directed the parties to
address four general questions, and be prepared to address several
follow-up questions relating to those four:
Therefore, by unanimous vote, the court directs the parties to appear
before the court on September 7, 2016, for oral argument to address
(1) what remains to be done to timely achieve constitutional
compliance, (2) how much it is expected to cost, (3) how the State
intends to fund it, and (4) what significance, if any, the court should
attach to E2SSB 6195 in determining compliance with the court’s
order to provide a complete plan. A decision on whether to dismiss
the contempt order or to continue sanctions will be determined by
order following the hearing. The parties should be prepared to address
these issues in addition to the other questions enumerated in this order.
[July 2016 Order at p.2.]
Plaintiffs address the four general questions below. Part III of this filing
then addresses the other questions enumerated by the Court.
1.

What remains to be done to timely achieve constitutional
compliance?
Answering the Court’s first general question requires an answer to

three questions: (a) what does constitutional compliance require? (b) by
when must full compliance be done to be timely? (c) what remains to be
done to achieve that compliance?
(a)

What does constitutional compliance require?

The State’s August 22 filing did not address this foundation for the
Court’s first question. But this Court’s 2012 rulings did:
● “Article IX, section 1 confers on children in Washington a
positive constitutional right to an amply funded education”,

-251548756.2

● “the State must amply provide for the education of all
Washington children as the State’s first and highest priority
before any other State programs or operations”,
● “ample” means “considerably more than just adequate”,
● the State is violating this constitutional mandate, and
● 2018 is the “firm deadline for full constitutional compliance.”
See Discussion Part III.B below (underlines added).
That’s Washington law. And in a constitutional democracy,
everyone – even lawmakers – must obey the law.
(b)

By when must full compliance be done to be timely?

With respect to the “2018” compliance deadline, this Court’s
July 2016 Order emphasized that “The 2017 legislative session presents
the last opportunity for complying with the State’s paramount duty under
article IX, section 1 by 2018.”2
The 2017-2018 school year is the one after that 2017 legislative
session. It is also the one funded by the State’s “FY 2018” budget (the
July 1, 2017 – June 30, 2018 fiscal year). And the one in which the K-12
“Class of 2018” graduates (the 2017-2018 school year seniors). And the
deadline repeatedly specified for the compliance plan ordered by this
Court (“a complete plan for fully implementing its [the State’s] program

2

July 14, 2016 Order at pp.1-2.
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of basic education for each school year between now and the 2017-18
school year”).3
The State’s most recent filing nonetheless asserts “2018” means
the 2018-2019 school year instead.4 The State’s request for an additional
year of delay is understandable given the huge task that its longstanding
procrastination has punted to the 2017 legislature. But as Part III.D below
explains, the State’s claim that this Court’s compliance plan Orders set a
2018-2019 school year deadline is not correct.
(c)

What remains to be done to achieve timely constitutional
compliance?

The State’s most recent filing takes the position that not much
remains to be done because the State is now fully funding all but two of
the State’s basic education program components – namely: (1) “complete”
the full funding of K-3 class size reduction in the 2017-2018 school year,
and (2) “fully fund” the compensation necessary to attract and retain
school personnel.5
But the State’s “full funding” claims are based on the State funding
its funding formulas – not on its funding the actual cost of implementing

3

January 9, 2014 Order at p.8; again in June 8, 2015 Order at pp.2-3.
State’s August 22, 2016 filing at pp.5-8.
5
State’s August 22, 2016 filing at pp.33-34, accord, pp.2-3 (“fully funding” all but K-3
and compensation, as long as maintenance level funding for the other components’
existing State funding formulas is appropriated).
4
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its basic education program.

That’s important because this Court’s

January 2012 decision held that the State cannot declare “full funding” for
any component of the State’s basic education program if the State’s
funding formula leaves part of a school’s actual costs to implement that
component unfunded. That’s fatal to the State’s “full funding” claims
because, as detailed in Part III.C below, the State’s funding formulas on
their face continue to leave types of actual implementation costs unfunded.
Although some of the State’s funding formulas are meaningfully
better today than they were in the past, that does not change the fact that
partial funding still is not full funding. This Court’s July 2016 Order is
accordingly correct: “What remains to be done to achieve compliance is
undeniably huge”.6
2.

How much is the State’s timely constitutional compliance
expected to cost?
As noted in Part III.E below, this question is no surprise. The

February 2010 Final Judgment ordered the State to determine its answer to
this question, and that order remained binding on the State until it was
vacated in January 2012.7 Moreover, the State assured this Court in 2010
and 2011 that it did not need any more studies to determine its answer
because the State was already well on its way to finalizing that
6
7

July 14, 2016 Order at p.2.
Plaintiffs’ 2012 Post-Budget Filing at p.40 and nn.110 & 111.
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determination. The State also had to calculate the answer to this question
to comply with the series of ensuing court orders requiring the State to
produce its complete year-by-year phase in plan for fully funding all the
components of the State’s basic education program by the 2017-2018
school year. And it is now less than five months before the 2017 session
that this Court’s most recent Order emphasized “presents the last
opportunity for complying with the State’s paramount duty under
article IX, section 1 by 2018.”8
The State’s August 22, 2016 filing nonetheless fails to answer this
long pending “how much will it cost” question.
With respect to amply funding the most expensive component of
its basic education program (the compensation required to attract and
retain competent personnel), the State claims it doesn’t know the answer.
So this year it created a task force to give the 2017 legislature some sort of
numbers at the last minute when its regular session starts.
And with respect to amply funding the actual cost of all the other
components, the State does not give an actual cost answer. It instead
points to the partial funding amounts provided by its funding formulas.

8

July 14, 2016 Order at pp.1-2.
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In short, the State’s most recent filing does not address the actual
cost of amply funding full implementation of the State’s basic education
program in compliance with Article IX, section 1. Part III.C below.
3.

How does the State intend to fund its timely constitutional
compliance?
Part III.E below explains why this question is similarly no surprise:

The February 2010 Final Judgment ordered the State to answer this
question. That court order remained binding on the State until it was
vacated in January 2012. The State assured this Court in 2010 and again
in 2011 that it was already well on its way to answering this question. And
the State assured this Court in 2014 that the State’s 2015 legislative
session was going to focus on securing the revenue needed to comply with
the ample funding mandate of Article IX, section 1.
The State’s August 22, 2016 filing nonetheless fails to answer this
long pending “how will you pay for it” question. That’s because, despite
all the advance warnings given to the State and the State’s assurances to
this Court in response, the State still has not figured out how it is going to
fund the actual cost of full constitutional compliance in this case.

-751548756.2

4.

Does E2SSB 6195 comply with the court’s order to provide a
complete plan?
The court orders in this case have been clear. To ensure the State

did not make full constitutional compliance impractical by putting too
much off until the last year before the deadline, this Court has for the past
four years been repeatedly ordering the State to produce the State’s
complete year-by-year plan for phasing in the State’s ample funding of
each component of its basic education program. Part III.F below.
E2SSB 6195 created a task force to come up with possible ideas
for the 2017 legislature to consider. That’s an exercise which might come
up with ideas for some sort of last-minute enactment. One which might
provide for amply funding all the State’s K-12 public schools by the firm
deadline for full constitutional compliance in this case.
But this Court did not order the State to start an exercise in 2016 to
try to come up with possible ideas for a last-minute enactment in 2017.
This Court has repeatedly been ordering the State to produce its complete
year-by-year phase in plan making steady, real, and measurable progress
towards full compliance with Section 1’s ample funding mandate by the
firm deadline in this case. E2SSB 6195’s punt to come up with possible
ideas for trying to do something at the last minute is not the complete

-851548756.2

year-by-year phase in plan this Court has been repeatedly ordering the
State to submit since 2012. Part III.F below.
III.
A.

DISCUSSION

Underlying Meaning of “Basic Education” and
“Basic Education Program”
The court rulings in this case distinguish between the meaning of

“education” in Section 1 (“basic education”) and the State’s program to
provide children a realistic and effective opportunity to receive that
education (“basic education program”).9
With respect to substantive content, the court rulings in this case
have held the term “basic education” includes the knowledge and skills
specified in ESHB 1209 (Laws of 1993, currently codified as
RCW 28A.150.210).10 For example, the basic knowledge and skills to:
 “know and apply core concepts and principles of...civics and
history”;


“know and apply core concepts and principles of mathematics”;



“think ... logically”;



“understand the importance of work and finance”; and



“read with comprehension”.

RCW 28A.150.210(2), (2), (3), (4), & (1) (quoted in full at McCleary, 173
Wn.2d at 523, n.20).

9

See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.6-7 and nn.4-7.
See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.6-7 and nn.4-7.

10
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Plaintiffs note these five substantive elements of a basic education
because, as the following discussion illustrates, they directly relate to the
insufficiency of the State’s most recent filing.
B.

Basic Civics & History: Lawmakers Are Not Above The Law
[“know and apply core concepts and principles of ... civics and
history” RCW 28A.150.210(2)]
Plaintiffs recognize that one reason many elected officials have

been disregarding the urgency of complying with the court rulings in this
case is their insistence that the judicial branch has no business telling
members of other branches what to do.
As a matter of basic civics and history, those elected officials are
wrong. Constitutional democracies are governed by the rule of law. In a
constitutional

democracy,

elected

officials

must

comply

with

constitutional rights, civil rights, and court orders. Even if compliance is
not politically popular or convenient. And it is the judicial branch’s duty
to uphold the rule of law when elected officials find it more politically
popular or convenient not to.

- 10 51548756.2

1.

Civics
This Court celebrated the 800th anniversary of the Magna Carta last

year because that document established the bedrock principle that no
person is above the law – even royalty sitting at the top of government.11
That same principle applies here. No person is above the law –
even high ranking elected officials in State government.
And with respect to education funding, the law each and every one
of our current lawmakers swore to uphold when taking office was
unequivocally clear before they took that oath:
● “Article IX, section 1 confers on children in Washington a
positive constitutional right to an amply funded education”,
● “the State must amply provide for the education of all
Washington children as the State’s first and highest priority
before any other State programs or operations”,
● “ample” means “considerably more than just adequate”,
● the State is violating this constitutional mandate, and
● 2018 is the “firm deadline for full constitutional compliance.”
See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.6-12 (quoting McCleary v.
State, 173 Wn.2d 477, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) and this Court’s
December 2012 Order at p.2).
In a democracy, constitutional rights matter.

They are rights

guaranteed to all citizens – regardless of whether they are in the electoral
11

See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at p.50 & n.95; cf. Plaintiffs’ 2014 Answer
To Defendant’s Response To The Court’s Show Cause Order With Errata at pp.34-35
(rule of law in a democracy).
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majority or have political influence with elected officials.12 And the legal
rulings in this case have long reiterated that
● the ample funding right conferred by Section 1 is each
Washington child’s paramount right under our State
Constitution,
● this right to an amply funded K-12 education is a crucial civil
right in our democracy, and
● the court orders in this case must be obeyed.
See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.6-12 & p.46, n.89; see also
2014 Contempt Order at p.3 (“These orders are not advisory or designed
only to get the legislature’s ‘attention’; the court expects them to be
obeyed even though they are directed to a coordinate branch of
government. When the orders are not followed, contempt is the lawful and
proper means of enforcement in the orderly administration of justice.”).13
These legal rulings are no surprise to Washington lawmakers. Nor
are the repeated Supreme Court orders requiring them to submit the
State’s complete ample funding phase in plan to ensure full constitutional
compliance by the deadline.

12

See Plaintiffs’ 2014 Answer To Defendant’s Response To The Court’s Show Cause
Order With Errata at pp.34-35 (rule of law in a democracy).
13
As this Court knows from the plaintiff school district’s briefing in the Seattle School
District case, the word “Preamble” is is NOT in Article IX, section 1 of the actual
Washington State Constitution. It’s instead a stylistic heading added by the code reviser.
Supreme Court No. 44845, September 29, 1977 Brief Of Respondents at pp.32-33 and
that appeal’s CP 784. A pdf of the actual handwritten constitution is available on the
Secretary of State’s website: https://www.sos.wa.gov/legacy/constitution.aspx .
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In short, a core concept and principle of civics in a constitutional
democracy is that no government official is above the law.

Even

lawmakers. As a basic matter of civics, lawmakers must comply with the
constitutional rights, civil rights, and court orders established in this case –
even when they find compliance politically unpopular or difficult.
2.

History
As this Court well knows from the prior briefing in this case, some

of the most unfortunate chapters in our democracy have been when the
judicial branch stood on the sidelines or looked the other way when
elected officials chose to violate the constitutional rights of citizens who
were not in the political majority.14
This Court likewise knows from this suit’s prior briefing that some
of the most meaningful chapters in our democracy have been when the
judicial branch instead stood up and protected the constitutional rights of
citizens who are not in the political majority.15

14

See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.43-44 & n.88 (re: Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), later proceeding granting writ of coram nobis, 584 F.Supp.
1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984)).
15
See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at p.44 & n.89 (re: Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) & 349 U.S. 294 (1955), reversing Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896)); Plaintiffs’ 2015 Answer To The Amicus Brief Of Mr. Eugster at
pp.3-5 (discussing courts’ enforcing the constitutional right of children to a desegregated
public education after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) & 349 U.S. 294
(1955), reversing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)); Plaintiffs’ 2014 Post-Budget
Filing at pp.38-42 (discussing same).
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Plaintiffs recognize that State government officials historically
object when a court orders them to comply with constitutional rights that
are expensive to implement or not popular with the majority of voters –
e.g., elected officials in Kansas,16 New Jersey,17 New York,18 Alabama,19
Georgia,20 Mississippi,21 South Carolina,22 Virginia,23 and Louisiana.24
16

E.g., http://www.hdnews.net/news/local/from-m-to-contempt-of-court-what-could-happenin/article_9a8e8936-7454-56c5-b114-fdca4cd50cc8.html (State Senator Park on defying
Kansas Supreme Court’s school funding order: “They have one job and one job only.
And that is to reason and listen to the evidence and make the opinion. And that’s all it is,
an opinion. They can’t tell us what to do, they can opine and that’s the end of their
authority.”); http://www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/article81056542.html (State Sen.
Ostmeyer lamenting “the Legislature should have defied the court back in 2005 when it
ruled school funding insufficient”); http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2016/jun/01/kansaslawmakers-their-own-words-dropping-little-t/ (State Sen. Melcher objecting: “They’re going
to continue dropping little turds like they have at the appropriate times to do everything
that they can to try to distract the Legislature. And for us to play this game with them is
just encouraging them to continue engaging in this bad behavior. Eventually we’re going
to have to stand up to this court and let them know that we are the Legislature. They are
not the Legislature. Capitulating with them, I think, is a poor strategy....”).
17
New York Times, May 18, 1976, p.71 (quoting State legislators’ accusations that the
State Supreme Court’s school funding rulings were “‘overstepping’ its jurisdiction and
‘usurping the constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Legislature’”).
18
1/26/88 Newsday 32, 1988 WLNR 193445 (“‘We will continue to fight [against the
court’s housing desegregation order],’ said [Yonkers City] Councilman Henry Spallone,
who represents the city’s white southeast section. ‘There is no surrender.’”); 1/29/88
New York Times B1, 1988 WLNR 1366153 (councilmember’s refusing to comply with
Judge Sand’s desegregation order saying: “Nuts to you, Judge Sand. You wanna take me
in? Come on and try it!”); 8/1/88 Los Angeles Times 1, 1988 WLNR 1866198 (council
member declaring: “There is no surrender for me.... This is total war.”); 8/2/88 Los
Angeles Times 1, 1988 WLNR 1870050 (council members’ explaining their defiance of
the court’s desegregation order: “Am I supposed to simply bow to a judge who would
destroy a city?” (council member Spallone); “It’s a sad day when a madman federal
judge wants to punish elected officials for representing their constituencies as their
constituencies demand” (councilmember Longo)).
19
See Plaintiffs’ 2014 Post-Budget Filing at p.38 (Governor Wallace’s famous speech
defying a court’s desegregation order, declaring the court order to be an “unwelcomed,
unwanted, unwarranted and force induced intrusion upon the campus of the University of
Alabama....There has been no legislative action...justifying this intrusion.... I stand here
today, as Governor of this sovereign State, and refuse to willingly submit to illegal
usurpation of power.... My action does not constitute disobedience to legislative and
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constitutional provisions. It is not defiance -- for defiance sake, but...a call for...a
cessation of usurpation and abuses.”).
20
Atlanta Constitution, June 1, 1955, p.6 (Georgia House of Representatives Speaker
Marvin Moate’s response to Brown v. Board of Education: “we are going to use all
means possible to put it off in Georgia”; Georgia Attorney General Eugene Cook
declaring we cannot and will not levy taxes to comply with the Supreme Court’s ruling);
Atlanta Constitution, June 2, 1955, front page (Georgia Attorney General Eugene Cook
declaring the court’s “psycho-political decision” had “forfeited the last vestige of
respect with those who believe in constitutional government might have held for it”);
Augusta Chronicle, June 1, 1955, front page (former Gov. Talmadge insisting that
Georgia “will not submit” because it is the “Supreme Court which has departed from the
Constitution and the law, not us”, and “Under no circumstances will we sacrifice the
welfare and best interests of our children to satisfy such an unconstitutional decision of
the Supreme Court”); Augusta Chronicle, June 2, 1955, p.1 (Georgia State Attorney
General Eugene Cook insisting the Supreme Court’s desegregation ruling was contrary
to the law and constitution, and usurped powers of the legislative branch); Aikin [S.C]
Standard & Review, June 1, 1955, front page (Georgia School Superintendent M.D.
Collins’ objections that his State can’t levy taxes to fund compliance with the Supreme
Court’s desegregation ruling); Anniston [Alabama] Star, June 1, 1955, front page (Gov.
Marvin Griffin declaring Georgia’s schools will remain segregated notwithstanding what
the court says, because “No matter how much the Supreme Court seeks to sugarcoat its
bitter pill of tyranny, the people of Georgia and the South will not swallow it.”); Atlanta
Constitution, June 1, 1955, front page (“Gov. Griffin defiantly proclaimed Tuesday that
Georgians will not accept the U.S. Supreme Court’s desegregation ruling”); Atlanta
Constitution, June 1, 1955, front page (former Gov. Talmadge declaring “The people of
Georgia will not comply with the decision for a long, long time”); New Orleans TimesPicayune, June 1, p.3 (Georgia State School Superintendent M.D. Collins objecting that
the State cannot levy taxes to pay for what the Supreme Court ordered); New Orleans
Times-Picayune, June 1, p.3 (Georgia Gov. Marvin Griffin declaring his State will
continue its segregated schools since his State was not a party to the Brown v. Board of
Education suit).
21
New York Times, June 3, 1955, p.10 (Mississippi’s U.S. Senator John Stennis
declaring the Supreme Court Justices had “abandoned their role as judges of the law and
organized themselves into a group of social engineers); Augusta Chronicle, June 1, 1955,
front page (Mississippi’s U.S. Senator Eastland calling the Supreme Court a “crowd of
racial politicians” and insisting “To resist them is the only answer. We must resist
them....”).
22
Aikin [S.C] Standard & Review, June 3, 1955, pp.1-2 (Reporting Clarendon County,
South Carolina, Superintendent of Education L.B. McCord’s reaction that the school
board will close the schools rather than submit to the Supreme Court’s desegregation
ruling); Aikin [S.C] Standard & Review, June 2, 1955, p.2 (Greenville, South Carolina
News reporting that “in the final analysis better education is the aim of the public school
system. To this end, integration of the races in South Carolina is neither feasible nor
desirable at this time.”).
23
Danville [Va.] Bee, June 1, 1955, p.1 (“political leaders declared flatly they will do
nothing”); Danville [Va.] Bee, June 1, 1955, p.2 (Virginia Governor declines to call a
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Plaintiffs also appreciate that State legislators here in Washington
have declared similar objections to the court orders in this case – e.g.,
responding that this Court can simply pound sand,25 that legislators will
not recognize any contempt ruling,26 and that the “Washington Supreme
Court has gone rogue. It is time for articles of impeachment.”27
But this Court has repeatedly assured Washington’s over 1 million
public school children that it will not stand on the sidelines cheering; that
it will instead vigilantly enforce Washington children’s positive,

special session, saying he thinks action requires more study); Aikin [S.C] Standard &
Review, June 2, 1955, front page (reporting Prince Edward County Virginia Board of
Supervisors’ unanimously voting to not approve next fiscal year’s budget for school
operations as a result of the Supreme Court’s desegregation ruling); New Orleans
Times-Picayune, June 2, p.5 (reporting Prince Edwards County, Virginia Board of
Supervisors’ unanimous decision to reject school operating budget rather than comply
with Supreme Court’s desegregation ruling).
24
New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 1, p.2 (Louisiana’s U.S. Representative
F. Edward Herbert objecting that “once again, politics has superseded the constitution”,
and reiterating Andrew Jackson’s response to a Marshall Court ruling he didn’t like:
“Justice Marshall has given his decision, now let him enforce it”); New Orleans TimesPicayune, June 1, p.l (New Orleans school board’s unanimous objection that “the
education of both races can proceed more effectively under a segregated system”).
25
See Plaintiffs’ 2014 Post-Budget Filing at p.38, n.113 (State Senator Sen.
Baumgartner’s widely tweeted “pound sand” response to this Court’s Order, available at
http://www.seattlemet.com/news-and-profiles/publicola/articles/fizz-for-jan-16-januarytricky-2014 ).
26
See Plaintiffs’ 2014 Post-Budget Filing at p.38, n.113 (several lawmakers’
January 17, 2014 letter to the Supreme Court on Washington State Legislature letterhead
stating: “After reviewing the court’s ‘order’, we respectfully reject the court’s attempt to
wrongfully intrude upon the constitutional prerogatives of the legislative branch. ... The
court lacks the authority to hold the Legislature in contempt of its [McCleary] decision
and we the undersigned will not recognize any such order from the court. ... It is our
sincere hope that you will not continue to perpetuate a constitutional crisis.... It is a
crisis in which you will not prevail.”).
27
Tacoma News Tribune, August 13, 2015 (quoting Washington State Representative
Manweller) http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/politics-government/article31008225.html .
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constitutional right to an amply funded K-12 education; and that the 2018
deadline in this case is a firm deadline for the State’s full constitutional
compliance.28
In short, history confirms that a critical role of an independent
judicial branch in our democracy is to vigilantly protect citizens’ legal
rights when officials in the other branches find it politically popular or
financially expedient to do otherwise. Which is the case here.
C.

Basic Math Concept: Partial ≠ Full
[“know and apply core concepts and principles of mathematics”
RCW 28A.150.210(2)]
A math teacher would put it this way: ¾ x ≠ x. That’s the basic

math concept of fractions.29
This Court’s January 2012 decision put it this way: funding a
portion of a school district’s actual cost is not fully funding that cost.30
That’s Washington law.
The State’s Department of Revenue would put it this way: paying
a portion of your taxes is not fully paying your taxes.

That’s basic

accounting.
And a lay person would put it this way: partially filling a hole isn’t
fully filling that hole. That’s common sense.
28

See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.44-45 & n.89, p.14, pp.6-11.
Unless x = 0.
30
See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.18-19 & n.35, p.23.
29
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These basic points of math, law, taxes, and common sense lead to
the same truth:
Partial ≠ Full.
And as the following pages briefly explain, this basic truth defeats the
“full funding” claims asserted in the State’s most recent filing.
1.

To/From Pupil Transportation
We’ve been here before in this case:
● This Court’s January 2012 decision affirmed that Section 1
requires the State to amply fund pupil transportation.
● That January 2012 decision also held the State cannot declare
“full funding” if its funding formula leaves part of a district’s
actual cost unfunded – noting as one example that “If the
State’s funding formulas provide only a portion of what it
actually costs a school to ... get kids to school..., then the
legislature cannot maintain that it is fully funding basic
education through its funding formulas.”
● The State’s transportation funding formula does not fund a
school district’s actual cost of getting kids to and from
school. Instead, it funds the lower of two numbers: (1) that
district’s costs last year, or (2) the State-wide average cost
last year.
● The State has nonetheless repeatedly declared it is “fully
funding” each district’s transportation costs.

See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.22-25 (detailing the above).
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The State’s most recent filing repeats the same “full funding”
declaration.31 But declaring full funding based on a formula’s partial
funding does not comply with the above court rulings in this case.
Nor does it make sense. For example, legislators would not say the
State “fully funded” this year’s legislative pay raise of 11.2% if the State
instead paid legislators their lower salary from last year. Nor would
legislators from Pend Orielle or Asotin say the State “fully funded” their
travel expenses to and from Olympia if the State instead paid only the
State-wide average for legislators (most of whom have to travel a much
shorter distance).
Knowing and applying the basic math concept of fractions
confirms the State’s claim to have achieved “full funding” of its school
districts’ pupil transportation costs is false. Partial ≠ Full.
2.

Materials, Supplies, and Operating Costs (MSOCs)
We’ve also been here before in this case:
● This Court’s January 2012 decision affirmed that Section 1
requires the State to amply fund it school districts’ Materials,
Supplies, and Operating Costs (MSOCs).
● That January 2012 decision also held the State cannot declare
“full funding” if its formula leaves part of a district’s actual
cost unfunded – noting as one example that “If the State’s
funding formulas provide only a portion of what it actually
costs a school to ... keep the lights on, then the legislature
31

State’s August 22, 2016 filing at pp.9-10 (transportation funding formula fully
funded).
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cannot maintain that it is fully funding basic education
through its funding formulas.”
● That decision (and ensuing court orders) also held that when
an earlier snapshot does not correlate to constitutionally
ample funding today, fully funding that outdated snapshot
is not “full funding”.
● The State’s MSOC funding formula does not fund a school
district’s actual materials, supplies, and operating costs
today. Instead, it is limited to (1) a snapshot of what districts
purchased with the unconstitutional underfunding they had in
the 2007-2008 school year, and (2) the State-wide average
cost in that old snapshot.
● The State has nonetheless repeatedly declared it is “fully
funding” each district’s materials, supplies, and operating
costs (MSOCs).
See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.22-25 (detailing the above).
The State’s most recent filing asserts the same “full funding”
declaration.32 But declaring full funding based on a formula limited to
partial funding does not comply with the court rulings in this case.
Nor does it make sense.

For example, the University of

Washington would not say that funding the costs it had in the 2007-2008
school year would “fully fund” its costs today. Nor would the State
32

State’s August 22, 2016 filing at pp.10-11 (dollars per student funding formula
funded). The State’s assertion at p.18, n.28 that its MSOC funding formula funds
“professional development” is misleading if one reads that assertion to say the MSOC
formula funds the staff time and employee compensation costs for professional
development. It doesn’t. As this Court’s January 2012 decision noted, Materials,
Supplies, and Operating Costs (MSOCs) is the new name for what used to be called NonEmployee Related Costs (NERCs). The MSOC “professional development” allocation to
which the State’s filing refers accordingly does not include the employee compensation &
benefits costs relating to professional development, but rather materials, supplies, and
related costs for professional development. The dollar figures in the MSOC statute the
State cites (RCW 28A.150.260(8)) confirm this fact ($18.89 to $24.93 allocation for a
district’s “professional development” Materials, Supplies, and Operating Costs).

- 20 51548756.2

Department Of Transportation’s Eastern Region (based in Spokane) say
that funding the State-wide average cost for snow plowing and snow
removal would “fully fund” that region’s actual snow plowing and snow
removal costs.
Knowing and applying the basic math concept of fractions
confirms the State’s claim to “fully fund” its school districts’ materials,
supplies, and operating costs (MSOCs) is false. Partial ≠ Full.
3.

All-Day Kindergarten and K-3 Class Size Reduction
We’ve been here before in this case too:
● This Court’s January 2012 decision affirmed that Section 1
requires the State to amply fund all-day kindergarten and K-3
class size reduction.
● That decision also held the State cannot declare “full
funding” when it leaves part of a district’s actual costs
unfunded.
● This Court’s ensuing Orders have further reiterated that
actual costs include the capital expense of building the
additional classrooms needed to fully implement all-day
kindergarten and K-3 class size reduction.
● The State’s funding formulas do not fund the actual cost of
implementing all-day kindergarten and K-3 class size
reduction. Instead, the State limits its funding to (1) a portion
of its school districts’ actual personnel costs, and (2) less than
¼ of the cost of building the additional classrooms required
to implement all-day kindergarten and K-3 class size
reduction.
● The State has nonetheless repeatedly declared it is “fully
funding” each district’s all-day kindergarten and K-3 class
size reduction costs.

- 21 51548756.2

See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.18-21 (detailing the above).
The State’s most recent filing repeats the same “full funding”
declaration.33 But declaring full funding based on partial funding does not
comply with the court rulings in this case.
Nor does it make sense. For example, with respect to personnel
costs, the Washington State Patrol would not say the State “fully funded”
its personnel costs if the State paid only a portion of those costs instead.
Especially if the State Patrol was staring down the barrel of an impending
shortage of troopers like the significant shortage of K-3 teachers currently
aimed at the State’s school districts.
The State’s “full funding” declaration similarly does not make
sense with respect to the cost of constructing the additional classrooms
needed to implement all-day kindergarten and K-3 class size reduction.
For example, the Washington State Department Of Transportation would
not say the State “fully funds” its construction costs for the State highway
system if the State funded ¼ instead.
Moreover, with respect to classroom construction costs, the State
does not dispute that:

33

State’s August 22, 2016 filing at p.11 (full statewide implementation of all-day
kindergarten fully funded in the 2016-2017 school year [FY 2017]); and at pp.11-12
(State on schedule to fully fund K-3 class size reduction by the 2017-2017 school year
deadline).
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● this Court’s January 2012 decision held the State cannot
declare “full funding” when it leaves part of a district’s actual
costs unfunded;
● the State’s school districts must construct additional
classrooms to fully implement the all-day kindergarten and K-3
class size reduction components of the State’s basic education
program; and
● the State’s funding formulas leave the actual cost of
constructing those additional classrooms largely unfunded.
The State nonetheless declares “full funding”, claiming that the State isn’t
responsible for the cost of building the additional classrooms required to
implement the all-day kindergarten and K-3 class size reduction
components of the State’s basic education program.34
But that’s not what this Court’s rulings say. This Court held over
four years ago that the State cannot declare “full funding” when it leaves
part of a district’s actual costs unfunded.

And as noted earlier, this

Court’s ensuing Orders expressly reiterated that these actual costs include
the capital expense of building the additional classrooms needed to fully
implement all-day kindergarten and K-3 class size reduction.
The State therefore offers several justifications for its refusal to
abide by this capital expense mandate in the Court’s prior Orders:
● The State suggests it doesn’t have to amply fund construction
costs going forward because it hasn’t amply funded those costs
in the past.35 But if that’s a valid argument, then the State also
34

State’s August 22, 2016 filing at pp.19-21.
State’s August 22, 2016 filing at p.19 (State has always assumed local voters pay for
facilities).
35
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doesn’t have to amply fund its basic education program as a
whole going forward because it hasn’t amply funded those
costs in the past.
● The State suggests it doesn’t have to amply fund construction
costs because school districts are allowed to ask local voters to
pass a bond to fund the construction costs the State does not
fund.36 But if that’s a valid argument, then the State doesn’t
have to amply fund any part of its basic education program,
because school districts are also allowed to ask local voters to
pass a levy to fund basic education costs the State does not
fund.
● The State suggests it doesn’t have to amply fund construction
costs because the constitution establishes at least one source of
school construction funding from revenue such as timber
sales.37 But the constitution doesn’t say that’s the only source
of school construction funding.
● The State suggests the Edmonds School District case supports
its claim that the State doesn’t have to amply fund construction
costs.38 That case simply held that a local jurisdiction (the City
of Mountlake Terrace) could require a building permit for high
school construction because the State has not prohibited cities
from requiring a school district to have a building permit or
comply with municipal building codes.39 It did not hold that
the State’s constitutional duty to amply fund its K-12 public
schools excludes the capital costs.
In summary, the State’s funding formulas leave the actual cost of
implementing all-day kindergarten and K-3 class size reduction largely
unfunded – especially with respect to compensation sufficient to attract
and retain the thousands of additional teachers needed to fill our schools’
looming teacher shortage in those grades, and build the thousands of
36

State’s August 22, 2016 filing at pp.19-20.
State’s August 22, 2016 filing at p.20.
38
State’s August 22, 2016 filing at pp.20-21 (citing Edmonds School District v. City of
Mountlake Terrace, 77 Wn.2d 609, 465 P.2d 177 (1970).
39
Edmonds School District v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 77 Wn.2d at 614.
37

- 24 51548756.2

additional classrooms needed to expand kindergarten from half day to
all day and lower K-3 class sizes to 17 students. Knowing and applying
the basic math concept of fractions confirms the State’s “full funding”
claim for these two components of its basic education program is false.
Partial ≠ Full.
4.

Other Program Components (e.g., highly capable students,
special education students, and Core 24)
Consistent with the State’s past approach of sweeping many

components of its basic education program under the rug in this case, the
State’s most recent filing does not mention the following components.
But these components are in this case:
● This Court’s January 2012 decision affirmed that the basic
education program components Section 1 requires the State
to amply fund include highly capable students, special
education students, and Core 24 – and that the State cannot
declare “full funding” when it leaves part of a district’s actual
costs for such components unfunded.
● The State’s funding formulas do not fund the actual cost of
implementing those components. For example, the State
(1) imposed more expensive highly capable student and
Core 24 requirements on school districts, while
(2) maintaining the past level of State funding. As another
example, the State’s special education funding formula
(1) limits funding to a maximum number of students instead
of the actual number of special education students the district
serves, and (2) limits compensation funding to less than the
number and salaries of personnel actually required.
● The State has nonetheless repeatedly declared it is “fully
funding” all components of its basic education program.
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See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at p.25 & n.52 (Highly Capable
component); Plaintiffs’ 2014 Post-Budget Filing at pp.25-26 (Core 24
component); June 7, 2016 Amicus Curiae Memorandum Of The Arc Of
Washington State, et al. (Special Education component).
The State’s most recent filing repeats the same “full funding”
declaration with respect to its basic education program.40 But as noted
before, declaring full funding based on partial funding does not comply
with the court rulings in this case.
Nor does it make sense. For example, if the State imposed more
expensive wildlife management requirements on its Department Natural
Resources (DNR), DNR would not say the State “fully funded” its wildlife
management program by simply maintaining its past level of funding.
Legislators would not say the State “fully funded” the cost of legislative
staff if the State (1) limited its funding to staff for 130 legislators (instead
of the actual 147 legislators in the legislature), and (2) limited
compensation funding to less than the number and salaries of staff the
legislature actually requires.
Knowing and applying the basic math concept of fractions
confirms that the State’s “full funding” claims concerning basic education

40

State’s August 22, 2016 filing at pp.33-34.
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program components relating to highly capable students, special education
students, and Core 24 are false. Partial ≠ Full.
5.

K-12 Personnel Costs
Finally, we’ve been here many times in this case as well:
● This Court’s January 2012 decision and ensuing court orders
have repeatedly emphasized that Section 1 requires the State
to amply fund the compensation needed to attract and retain
competent personnel.
● The State accordingly assured this Court that ESHB 2261
required the State to implement new compensation funding
formulas as their technical details were established by
ESHB 2261’s technical working group.
● That technical working group’s June 2012 Final Report
determined the salaries needed to attract and retain competent
K-12 personnel required an over $2.9 billion/year
compensation funding increase above the many years of
accumulating Cost Of Living Adjustments (COLAs)
mandated by Initiative 732, and stressed that “immediate
implementation” is needed “in order to attract and retain the
highest quality educators to Washington schools through full
funding of competitive salaries.”
● This Court’s August 2015 Sanctions Order nonetheless found
the State still had not implemented any such compensation
increase – and emphasized at least one concrete consequence
of the State’s ongoing failure is the looming shortage of
4,000 K-3 teachers in the State’s public schools.
● The State has repeatedly responded that it’s thinking about
doing something next year.

See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.14-21 (detailing the above
legal rulings and court filings these past several years).
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The State’s August 22, 2016 filing claims the State has not
increased compensation funding to attract and retain competent personnel
simply because “the estimated cost is not yet known”.41
But that’s not a legitimate excuse for the State’s continuing delays:
● The State has known for over four years that the cost is huge
– e.g., the over $2.9 billion/year amount that the ESHB 2261
technical working group’s June 2012 Final Report found
required “immediate implementation”.42
● The State has for years known that its school districts are
staring down the barrel of a significant teacher shortage with
the current compensation levels they are able to pay – even
when local levy and federal dollars are added on top of
current State funding.43
● The State has known for at least seven years that it lacks the
“data” its most recent filing now claims is needed to increase
compensation funding – for the State’s own witness testified
under oath about the State not having that data during the
2009 trial.44

41

State’s August 22, 2016 filing at p.26.
Supra, p.27, 3rd bullet point (ESHB 2261 Compensation Technical Working Group’s
June 2012 Final Report).
43
See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.8-9 & n.10.
44
E.g., Trial testimony of OSPI’s Director of School Apportionment and Financial
Services, Calvin Brodie, at RP 4179:1-11 (the State dictates the type of data that school
districts provide in their F-196 Reports because they do it on the system the State
provides), at RP 4363:1-11 (the resulting information requested by the State “really
doesn’t define what the State is funding versus what the local money is funding”); and
also at Tr.Ex.1470 at slide 2 & RP 4241:19-4242:8, 4248:23-4250:5, 4255:10-14,
4257:8-4258:23, 4267:9-4268:12, 4287:3-16, 4288:9-15 (testifying the need for more
information was recognized by the State’s Joint Task Force for Basic Education Finance
in 2008 – “Question and Task (per Chair): •State and local funds are co-mingled in
accounting categories •Do not know if local funds are expended to subsidize state
responsibilities •Need to establish systems that clearly distinguish state funding from
local funding.”).
42
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In short, the huge funding increase the State must enact to start
amply funding salaries and benefits to attract and retain competent
personnel is no surprise to the State. And its ongoing “maybe next year”
approach does nothing for the over 1 million kids in our State’s K-12
public schools or the looming teacher shortage their schools face this
upcoming 2017-2018 school year.
6.

“Full Funding” Conclusion
This Court’s most recent Order did not ask which basic education

funding formulas are (or will be) fully funded.

It asked which basic

education program components are (and will be) fully funded. This
distinction is dispositive – for as the above pages explain, the State’s
existing formulas partially fund the program components the State claims
to be fully funding this year, and the State submits no credible assurance
that its formulas will do more than partially fund the remaining program
components it alleges will be fully funded next year. Partial funding is not
full funding. As the basic points of math, law, taxes, and common sense
noted at the very beginning of this Part III.C confirm: Partial ≠ Full.
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D.

Basic Logic: the 2017-2018 School Year Seniors Are The
State’s Class of “2018”
[“think...logically” RCW 28A.150.210(3)]
The legislature also established that the substantive content of a

basic education under Section 1 includes the knowledge and skill to think
logically.45 And here, basic logic confirms that the 2017-2018 school year
is the “2018” deadline in this case.
This Court’s December 2012 Order mandated that “Year 2018
remains a firm deadline for full constitutional compliance.”46 And ever
since that 2012 Order, plaintiffs’ filings have repeatedly noted many of the
logical reasons why this school suit’s “2018” deadline is the 2017-2018
school year. For example:

45
46



The court orders in this case require the State’s compliance plan to
show compliance by the “2017-2018 school year” – which is
logical (and consistent) only if the “2018” deadline in this case is
that 2017-2018 school year.



The legislature’s self-imposed SHB 2776 compliance schedule sets
the last deadline as the “2017-2018 school year” – which is logical
(and consistent) only if the corresponding “2018” deadline in this
case is that 2017-2018 school year.



The State identifies time periods that cross between two years by
the second of those two years (e.g., the State’s “2018” fiscal year is
its 2017-2018 fiscal year) – making it only logical (and consistent)
that the “2018” deadline in this school funding case is the
corresponding 2017-2018 school year.



The State’s public schools identify their 2017-2018 school year
seniors as the class of “2018” – making it only logical (and

Supra, p.9 and five check-mark bullet points regarding ESHB 1209.
December 2012 Order at p.2 (underlines added).
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consistent) that the “2018” deadline in this public school case is
the corresponding 2017-2018 school year.
See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at p.13 (citing the relevant court
filings these past several years), see also State’s August 22, 2016 filing at
pp.12, 13, 18, 19, 33, & 34 (identifying the 2017-2018 fiscal year as
“FY 2018” and the 2018-2019 fiscal year as “FY 2019”).
Until seven days ago, the State never disputed or questioned that
this suit’s “2018” deadline is therefore the 2017-2018 school year.
But now the State wants to buy more time – so its August 2016
filing offers two reasons why this suit’s “2018” deadline should instead be
when students in the Class of 2019 are seniors:


Subsubsubsection 114(5)(b)(iii) of ESHB 2261 directed the QEC
to recommend a phase in schedule for completion by September 1,
2018.47 But the 2016 legislature repealed that provision, and
enacted E2SSB 6195 reiterating that the legislatively-set deadline
for fully funding the State’s basic education program is the end of
the 2017 legislative session.48



This Court is requiring the State to submit its final compliance
report after the 2018 legislative session.49 But that’s logically
consistent with the compliance deadline being the 2017-2018

47

State’s August 22, 2016 filing at pp.5-8 (claiming 2018 means the 2018-2019 school
year commencing on September 1, 2018)(which is funded by the State’s FY 2019 budget).
48
Laws of 2016, ch.162, §5 (repealing RCW 28A.290.010, which contained the
subsequent codification of the September 1, 2018, date in §114(5)(b)(iii) of ESHB 2261);
State’s August 22, 2016 filing at 8th bullet point on p.15 (E2SSB 6195 commits the
legislature to fully fund the State’s basic education program by the end of the
2017 legislative session) and at p.32 (same). Further confirming the legislature’s
understanding that all compliance must be completed by the commencement of the
2017-2018 fiscal year (July 1, 2017 – June 30, 2018) that funds the 2017-2018 school
year, E2SSB 6195 sunsets the day before that fiscal year starts (June 30, 2017). Laws of
2016, ch.3, §6 (“This act expires June 30, 2017”).
49
State’s August 22, 2016 filing a p.8.
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school year because the 2018 legislature’s development of funding
adjustments in the 2018-2019 supplemental budget would provide
a valuable assessment of whether the 2017 legislature’s funding for
the 2017-2018 school year had in fact amply funded all
components of the State’s basic education program.
The contempt and sanction orders in this case further confirm this
2017-2018 school year deadline. The September 2014 Contempt Order
was based on the 2017-2018 school year deadline: “The State failed to
submit by April 30, 2014 a complete plan for fully implementing its
program of basic education for each school year between now and the
2017-2018 school year”.50

And then the corresponding August 2015

Sanctions Order was based on that same school year, imposing its
$100,000 per day sanction until the State “adopts a complete plan for
complying with article IX, section 1 by the 2018 school year.”51
In short, the State’s newly asserted interpretation of this suit’s
longstanding deadline is convenient. But given all the above, it’s not
credible.

It’s instead just another excuse for more delay and

procrastination.
E.

Basic Finance: Paying Bills Requires Money
[“understand the importance of work and finance”
RCW 28A.150.210(4)]
A teacher in the personal finance courses commonly offered to

Washington high school students would put it this way: plan ahead to
50
51

See State’s August 22, 2016 filing at p.37 (quoting this ruling).
See State’s August 22, 2016 filing at p.37 (quoting this ruling).
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make sure you have enough money to pay your bills as they come due.
That’s basic finance.
As noted earlier, the court rulings in this case have for years been
putting it this way: the State must establish stable and dependable State
tax sources to amply fund its K-12 schools by the firm deadline in this
case for full constitutional compliance. That’s Washington law.
And thus as also noted earlier, in 2014 the State assured this Court
that its 2015 legislature would accordingly focus on establishing new
revenue to pay the huge ample funding bill that’s due in full next year.
1.

The Multi-Billion Dollar Bill Due In Full Next Year
The State has long known that the actual cost of amply funding the

basic education mandated by Section 1 would require the State to increase
State per-pupil funding to at least $12,701 per student before adding
inflation and capital costs. That’s the number consistent with the State’s
own testimony and submission at trial.52

When the approximately

$2 billion cost of the additional classrooms needed to implement the
State’s K-3 class size reduction and all-day kindergarten components are
included, that figure rises to over $14,700 per student by the compliance
deadline.53
52

See Plaintiffs’ 2013 Post-Budget Filing at pp.12-13.
The $2 billion capital cost for that classroom construction is explained in Plaintiffs’
2016 Post-Budget Filing at p.20, n.39; Plaintiffs’ 2015 Post-Budget Filing at pp.34-35;
53
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When the February 2010 Final Judgment ordered the State to
follow up on its trial testimony to determine and specify the actual cost of
amply funding the basic education mandated by Section 1, the State
convinced this Court to vacate that order by arguing such follow-up
wasn’t necessary – assuring this Court that the State was already well on
its way to completing its cost determinations and declaring that
“No additional court-ordered studies are necessary.”54
According to the State’s prior filings with this Court, its per-pupil
funding for the upcoming 2016-2017 school year is $9,024.55 That means
State funding must increase by over $5,600 per pupil to achieve the
previously-noted over $14,700 per pupil amount.56 For the over 1 million
kids in our State’s K-12 public schools, that comes to an over $5.6 billion
increase in school district funding for the next year.57 Not next two-year
biennium. Next single year. That’s a huge bill.

and Plaintiffs’ 2013 Post-Budget Filing at pp.30-32. That comes to about $2,000/pupil if
spread over 1 million students. $12,701 + $2,000 = $14,701.
54
August 2010 Brief Of Appellant (Corrected) at p.59; see, also, e.g., Plaintiffs’ 2012
Post-Budget Filing at pp.6-8; Plaintiffs’ 2013 Post-Budget Filing at pp.5-6; Plaintiffs’
2014 Post-Budget Filing at p.8, Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.35-36 & nn.7273.
55
See Chart B in the State's 2015 Report To The Supreme Court By The Joint Select
Committee On Article IX Litigation.
56
$14,700 - $9,024 = $5,676.
57
Over $5,600/pupil x over 1 million pupils = over $5.6 billion.
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2.

The State Still Doesn’t Know How It Will Pay That Bill
The February 2010 Final Judgment also ordered the State to

determine and specify how the State is going to fully fund the actual cost
of Section 1 compliance with stable and dependable State revenue.58 That
order remained binding on the State until it was vacated in January 2012.59
And as noted earlier, the State secured that vacation by assuring this Court
that it was already well on its way to doing what the trial court ordered.
But now in August 2016, the State acknowledges it still has not
done that.60 Instead, the State’s 2016 legislature punted by creating a task
force to come up with possible last-minute ideas for the State’s
2017 legislature to hopefully consider. In short, after all these years, the
State still does not know how it will come up with the billions of
additional dollars needed to pay the long-pending ample funding bill that
is due in full next year. From a basic finance perspective, that’s like a
person telling the bank he’s still thinking about getting some sort of a job
at the last minute to pay the huge balloon mortgage payment he’s known
about for several years.
Another basic finance error in the State’s filing is its suggestion
that school districts would have the ample funding they currently lack if

58

See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at p.34 & n.71.
Plaintiffs’ 2012 Post-Budget Filing at p.40 and nn.110 & 111.
60
State’s August 22, 2016 filing at pp.34-36.
59
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the State enacts “levy reform” to take local levy dollars away from school
districts and then hand those dollars back calling them “State” dollars.61
From a basic finance perspective, that makes as much sense as a person
suggesting he can pay for the groceries he’s buying by taking dollars out
of the grocery store’s cash register and then handing them back to the
cashier calling them “his” dollars.62
Thus, as this Court’s August 2015 Sanctions Order unequivocally
warned the State: “Local levy reform is not part of the court’s January 9,
2014 order.”63 Compliance with the State’s paramount constitutional duty
under Section 1 requires the State to amply fund its K-12 public schools –
not play a “reform” shell game that cosmetically changes the name on
school district dollars instead of substantively increasing the amount of
those dollars.64

61

State’s August 22, 2016 filing at p.35, 9th bullet point.
As shown in this suit’s prior filings, school districts’ TOTAL revenues (State, federal,
local levy, and private donations combined) are not sufficient to provide all students with
a realistic or effective opportunity to learn the knowledge and skills in the “basic
education” mandated by Article IX, section 1. E.g., Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing
at pp.8-9 & n.10. Changing the name of some of those dollars from “local levy” to
“State” does not change that fact.
63
August 2015 Sanctions Order at p.7, n.1 (underline added) (rejecting the State’s
claim that its ongoing violation of the January 9, 2014 Order should be excused because
increased State salary funding “must be tied to reform of the local levy system”).
64
See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.40-42; Plaintiffs’ 2015 Post-Budget
Filing at pp.31-32.
62
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3.

Basic Finance Conclusion
The legislature established that the substantive content of a

basic education under Section 1 includes an understanding of the
importance of finance.65 Even an elementary understanding of finance
dictates that for the State to fund its full compliance with Section 1, it
must establish the revenue to do so. The State’s August 2016 filing,
however, confirms the State still has not determined how it will do that by
the firm deadline in this case. Ongoing procrastination is not a legitimate
financing plan.
F.

Read with Comprehension: Complete Year-By-Year Phase In
Plan Means Complete Year-By-Year Phase In Plan
[“read with comprehension” RCW 28A.150.210(1)]
The legislature established that the substantive content of a

basic education under Section 1 also includes the knowledge and skill to
read with comprehension.66 That’s relevant here because reading and
comprehending the court orders in this case confirms that E2SSB 6195 is
not the plan ordered by this Court.
The court orders in this case have been clear. To ensure State
officials did not make full constitutional compliance impractical by
putting too much off until the last year before the deadline, this Court has
for the past four years been repeatedly ordering the State to produce the
65
66

Supra, p.9 and five check-mark bullet points regarding ESHB 1209.
Supra, p.9 and five check-mark bullet points regarding ESHB 1209.
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State’s complete year-by-year plan for phasing in the State’s ample
funding of each component of its basic education program,67 as well as
demonstrate how the State’s budget each year meets that phase-in plan.68
Before the State’s 2014 legislative session commenced, this Court
reiterated its Order in plain English that’s easy to read and comprehend:
it is hereby ordered: the State shall submit, no later than April 30,
2014, a complete plan for fully implementing its program of basic
education for each school year between now and the 2017-18
school year. This plan .... must include a phase-in schedule for
fully funding each of the components of basic education. ... it is
clear that the pace of progress must quicken.
January 9, 2014 Order at p.8 (underlines added).
Before the State’s 2015 legislative session adjourned, this Court
reiterated its Order again in plain English that’s easy to read and
comprehend, ordering that the plan submitted by the State
(a) must be a complete plan for fully implementing the State’s
program of basic education for each school year between now
and the 2017-2018 school year, addressing each of the areas of
K-12 education within ESHB 2261 and SHB 2776; and
(b) must include a phase-in schedule for fully funding each of the
components of basic education.
June 8, 2015 Order at pp.2-3 (underlines added).

67

December 2012 Order at pp.2-3; January 2014 Order at p.8; June 2014 Show
Cause Order at pp.2-3; September 2014 Contempt Order at pp.1-4; August 2015
Sanctions Order at pp. 1-3.
68
December 2012 Order at pp.2-3; September 2014 Contempt Order at p.1;
August 2015 Sanctions Order at p.2.
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E2SSB 6195 created a task force to come up with possible ideas
for the 2017 legislature to consider.

That’s an exercise which could

hopefully come up with ideas for a last-minute enactment that amply
funds all components of the State’s basic education program in all of the
State’s K-12 public schools by the firm deadline for full constitutional
compliance in this case.
But this Court did not order the State to start an exercise in 2016 to
try to come up with possible ideas to produce a last-minute enactment in
2017. This Court has repeatedly been ordering the State to produce its
complete ample funding plan for each school year between now and the
2017-2018 school year, making steady, real, and measurable progress to
achieve full compliance with Section 1’s ample funding mandate by the
firm deadline in this case.
The State’s filing last week suggested that this Court’s Washington
Association

of

Neighborhood

Stores

decision

prohibited

the

2016 legislature from adopting the year-by-year phase in plan ordered by
this Court.69 But that’s not what the case says. It establishes that the
2016 legislature could not make an appropriation for the next biennium’s
2017-2018 school year (the State’s FY 2018 budget). It did not prohibit
69

State’s August 22, 2016 filing at pp.38-40 (citing Washington Association of
Neighborhood Stores v. State, 149 Wn.2d 359, 70 P.3d 920 (2003)).
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the 2016 legislature (or any prior legislature) from enacting legislation
requiring future legislatures to make appropriations that fully fund the
actual cost of all components of the State’s basic education program – for
as the State’s own filing candidly admits, that case held “A direction to the
legislature (even the use of the word ‘shall’) to make an appropriation is
not itself an appropriation”.70
In short, E2SSB 6195’s punt to come up with possible ideas to try
to do something in the last legislative session before that firm deadline in
this case is not the complete year-by-year phase in plan this Court has
been repeatedly ordering the State to submit since 2012. In at least one
respect, the legislature has been correct: reading with comprehension is a
basic skill all citizens in our democracy should have.
G.

Constitutional Rights, Civil Rights, and Court Orders Should
Be Enforced
This Court’s July 2016 Order recognized that the State is now at

the end of the road, emphasizing the State’s “2017 legislative session
presents the last opportunity for complying with the State’s paramount
duty under article IX, section 1 by 2018.”71

70

State’s August 22, 2016 filing at p.40 (quoting Washington Association of
Neighborhood Stores, 149 Wn.2d at 368).
71
July 14, 2016 Order at pp.1-2.
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Plaintiffs’ prior briefing has already explained why they believe
constitutional rights, civil rights, and court orders matter.72 Their prior
briefing likewise demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the contempt and
monetary sanctions orders issued in this case.73 And the State’s most
recent filing did not refute that ineffectiveness.
The Supreme Court rulings in this case have repeatedly promised
the school children of our State that this Court will vigilantly enforce their
paramount and positive constitutional right under Article IX, section 1 to
an amply funded education.74

Plaintiffs ask this Court to keep that

promise.
72

See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.43-44.
See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at pp.45-46.
74
McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 483 (“Article IX, section 1 confers on children in
Washington a positive constitutional right to an amply funded education”) and 547
(“This court intends to remain vigilant in fulfilling the State’s constitutional
responsibility under article IX, section 1”); December 2012 Order at p.2 (“Each day
there is a delay risks another school year in which Washington children are denied the
constitutionally adequate education that is the State’s paramount duty to provide”) & p.3
(“We cannot wait until ‘graduation’ in 2018 to determine if the State has met minimum
constitutional standards”); January 2014 Order at p.8 (“This court also made a promise
to the school children of Washington: We will not ‘idly stand by as the legislature makes
unfulfilled promises for reform.’ McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 545. Our decision in this case
remains fully subject to judicial enforcement.”); September 2014 Contempt Order at p.3
(“These orders are not advisory or designed only to get the legislature’s ‘attention’; the
court expects them to be obeyed even though they are directed to a coordinate branch of
government. When the orders are not followed, contempt is the lawful and proper means
of enforcement in the orderly administration of justice.”) & pp.3-4 (“In retaining
jurisdiction in McCleary, the court observed that it ‘cannot stand idly by as the
legislature makes unfulfilled promises for reform.’ McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 545. Neither
can the court ‘stand idly by’ while its lawful orders are disregarded. To do so would be
to abdicate the court’s own duty as a coordinate and independent branch of the
government.”); August 2015 Sanctions Order at p.8 (“The State urges the court to hold
off on imposing sanctions, to wait and see if the State achieves full compliance by the
73
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The State acknowledges that the purpose of a contempt sanction is
to coerce a defendant’s decision-makers to choose to comply with a court
order by making compliance a better choice for those decision-makers
than continued non-compliance.75
This Court accordingly imposed a large monetary fine that would
be significant to most Washington State citizens. But that monetary fine
was not at all significant to Washington State officials.76
This Court’s August 2015 Sanctions Order repeatedly warned that
firmer sanctions – “including directing the means the State must use to
come into compliance with the court’s order” – could and would be
imposed if State decision-makers chose to continue the State’s ongoing
violation of the court orders in this case.77

2018 deadline. But time is simply too short for the court to be assured that, without the
impetus of sanctions, the State will timely meet its constitutional obligations. There has
been uneven progress to date, and the reality is that 2018 is less than a full budget cycle
away. As this court emphasized in its original [December 2012] order in this matter, ‘we
cannot wait until ‘graduation’ in 2018 to determine if the State has met minimum
constitutional standards.’ ”) & p.9 (imposing sanctions because of “the gravity of the
State’s ongoing violation of its constitutional obligation to amply provide for public
education” and “the need for expeditious action”).
75
State’s 2014 Show Cause Response at p.8; Plaintiffs’ 2014 Answer To Defendant’s
Response To The Court’s Show Cause Order With Errata at p.24 & n.30.
76
See Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at p.45.
77
August 2015 Sanctions Order at p.9 (“Given the gravity of the State’s ongoing
violation of its constitutional obligation to amply provide for public education, and in
light of the need for expeditious action, the time has come for the court to impose
sanctions. A monetary sanction is appropriate to emphasize the cost to the children,
indeed to all of the people of this state, for every day the State fails to adopt a plan for
full compliance with article IX, section 1. At the same time, this sanction is less intrusive
than other available options, including directing the means the State must use to come
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The State’s decision-makers chose to continue the State’s
violation.

This Court could now say it was only kidding when it

previously assured the school children of our State that it would vigilantly
enforce their constitutional rights. But as plaintiffs’ prior briefing pointed
out, most young children would object that “crossies don’t count.”
The State’s decision-makers have knowingly left this Court with
only two options: either (1) tell Washington’s public school children that
constitutional rights are empty platitudes and court orders are just
suggestions, or (2) impose one of the firm sanctions previously briefed in
this case to effectively compel State decision-makers to finally fulfill the
State’s paramount duty under Article IX, section 1 to amply fund the
education of all Washington school children by the firm deadline in this
case.
To be effective, that contempt sanction must make compliance
with Section 1’s ample funding mandate a more desirable option for State
decision-makers to choose than continued non-compliance.

Plaintiffs

into compliance with the court's order.”) & pp.8-9 (“The court has inherent power to
impose remedial sanctions when contempt consists of the failure to perform an act
ordered by the court that is yet within the power of a party to perform. .... Monetary
sanctions are among the proper remedial sanctions to impose, though the court also may
issue any order designed to ensure compliance with a prior order of the court. When, as
here, contempt results in an ongoing constitutional violation, sanctions are an important
part of securing the promise that a court order embodies: the promise that a
constitutional violation will not go unremedied.”).
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accordingly renew their request that this Court issue one of the following
two contempt sanctions previously briefed in this case:
One:

Issue a contempt sanctions order that gives the State’s

2017 regular session two options:
(a) choose to fully comply with the court orders and declaratory
judgments issued in this case, or
(b) choose to have the State’s unconstitutionally funded school
statutes struck down as unconstitutional, effective the first day
of the 2017-2018 school year.78
Either way, it’s the 2017 session’s choice. The 2016 session’s prompt and
concrete action in response to this Court’s striking down the
unconstitutionally funded charter schools statute illustrates that lawmakers
respond swiftly to school statute invalidation.
Two:

Issue a contempt sanctions order that gives the State’s

2017 regular session two options:
(a) choose to fully comply with the court orders and declaratory
judgments issued in this case, or
(b) choose to have all tax exemption statutes enacted by the
legislature (instead of amply funding K-12 schools) struck
down as unconstitutional, effective the first day of the
2017-2018 school year.79

78

See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ 2014 Answer To Defendant’s Response To The Court’s Show
Cause Order With Errata at pp.45-47.
79
Since the sales tax exemption on food (Initiative 345) was enacted by the voters
rather than by the legislature, this sanction would not affect that exemption if the State
chose to continue its non-compliance.
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Either way, it’s the 2017 session’s choice. But the 2013 session’s prompt
and concrete action in response to Boeing’s tax break request illustrates
that lawmakers respond swiftly when State tax exemption statutes are
involved.
IV.

CONCLUSION

“It’s like deja vu all over again”

Yogi Berra80

We’ve been here before in this case.
At trial, the State argued that fully funding the State’s basic
education program means fully funding the State’s funding formulas. The
February 2010 Final Judgment rejected the State’s tautological argument.
So did this Court’s January 2012 decision. And ever since that decision,
State lawmakers have been responding to Supreme Court Orders requiring
a complete, year-by-year phase in plan with promises of “we’ll come up
with one next year.”
Constitutional democracies are governed by the rule of law.
Lawmakers must accordingly comply with constitutional rights, civil
rights, and court orders. Even when not politically popular or easy.

80

Unfortunately, this isn’t the first time Yogi Berra’s comment applied to the defendant
State’s position in this case. See Plaintiff/Respondents’ November 19, 2010 Reply Brief
at p.14 (same Yogi Berra quote).
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And as explained above, this Court’s 2012 rulings made the law
with which Washington lawmakers must comply clear:
● “Article IX, section 1 confers on children in Washington a
positive constitutional right to an amply funded education”,
● “the State must amply provide for the education of all
Washington children as the State’s first and highest priority
before any other State programs or operations”,
● “ample” means “considerably more than just adequate”,
● the State is violating this constitutional mandate, and
● 2018 is the “firm deadline for full constitutional compliance.”
These legal rulings are no surprise to Washington lawmakers. Nor
are the repeated court orders requiring them to submit the State’s complete
ample funding plan to ensure full constitutional compliance by the
deadline. Elected officials are important. But they are not above the law.
The State’s 2016 session did not put the State on track for timely
compliance with the constitutional rights, civil rights, and court orders in
this case. To the contrary, the State’s August 2016 filing demonstrates
that:
● With only one year left before the deadline, the State’s full
funding claims continue to be based on partial funding.
● The State still doesn’t know how it will finance the cost of
full compliance with Section 1 by the impending deadline.
● E2SSB 6195 is not the complete year-by-year phase in plan
this Court has been ordering the State to submit since 2012.
Plaintiffs continue to believe that constitutional rights, civil rights,
and court orders matter. And as this Court’s July 2016 Order reiterated,
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the State’s “2017 legislative session presents the last opportunity for
complying with the State’s paramount duty under article IX, section 1 by
2018.”81 Plaintiffs accordingly renew their prior requests that this Court
take the firm action necessary to timely uphold and enforce the
constitutional rights, civil rights, and court orders in this case. Contempt
and monetary sanctions have unfortunately proven ineffective.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of August, 2016.
Foster Pepper PLLC
s/ Thomas F. Ahearne
.
Thomas F. Ahearne, WSBA No. 14844
Christopher G. Emch, WSBA No. 26457
Adrian Urquhart Winder, WSBA No. 38071
Kelly A. Lennox, WSBA No. 39583
Lee R. Marchisio, WSBA No. 45351
Attorneys for Plaintiffs McCleary Family,
Venema Family, and Network for Excellence in
Washington Schools (NEWS)

81

July 14, 2016 Order at pp.1-2.
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